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The collapse of a corporation which carries on business and trade on an
international scale, usually spawns an array of legal disputes and presents
some unique problems in the conflict of laws.1 Unlike a private
commercial contractual dispute in which the competing interests are
primarily, although rarely solely, defined by the parties themselves,
bankruptcy law is infused with an element of public policy. The fact that
bankruptcy legislation sets out a scheme of priorities and explicitly
provides the basis upon which a court may assume jurisdiciton to declare
a bankruptcy and appoint a trustee, is in itself an indication of the public
nature of bankruptcy law. In some jurisdictions there may even be serious
penal and social consequences attached to a bankruptcy.
A common element of all bankruptcy law is that it aims to facilitate
the distribution of the property of the debtor amongst a group of creditors
in the most expeditious, economical and equitable manner. Most
juridictions also seek to achieve this through the appointment of a single
administrator. Beyond this, however, bankruptcy laws may diverge in
many ways. To begin with, there is the question as to whether the
debtor's estate should be adjudicated in one jurisdiction, or should any
jurisdiction have the right to adjudicate the bankruptcy concurrently? If
a state adopts the former approach, that is, it attempts to facilitate a single
system, upon what basis should a court be permitted to assume
jurisdiction? Although domicile of the debtor is a common basis upon
which jurisdiction may be maintained, the mere presence of assets may
also be sufficient in accordance with the policies of some nations.
*Sarah K. Harding, LL.B. 1989, Dalhousie University, presently of the BCL programme at
Oxford University. This paper originated as an independent research project under the
guidance of Professor Vaughan Black.
1. The collapse of International Overseas, Ltd. (I.O.S.) provides an excellent example of the
complexity and volume of litigation which may arise in conjunction with the insolvency of a
multinational enterprise. Some of the reported disputes which arose out of the I.O.S. collapse
are: Schiowitz v. 1O.S. Ltd (1971), 24DLR (3d) 102 (N.B.S.C.); Re LO.S. Ltd (1973),
43 DLR (3d) 684 (N.B.S.C.A.D.); Cornfeld v. LO.S. Ltd (1979), 34 CBR (NS) 124 (U.S.D.C.
- Southern District of N.Y).
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The treatment of property may also differ quite substantially. In some
jurisdictions a declaration of bankruptcy may result in the transfer of all
of the assets, wherever they are located, to the trustee or it may merely
result in the transfer of those assets within the territory. If the former
universal approach is adopted, as opposed to the latter territorial
approach, it is necessary to further determine what effect adjudication
will have on property outside of the jurisdiction and conversely, what
effect will a foreign adjudication have on property within the jurisdiction.
Thus it is apparent that the policies inherent in the bankruptcy laws of
any one particular nation will provide an additional concern for a court
in adjudicating an international insolvency. In resolving disputes, it must
keep in mind the interests of the debtor, the creditors, and the interests of
other nations in which assets or creditors are located. The legislation in
any jurisdiction, and Canada is no exception, will provide an array of
specific rules, but it is the courts which must ultimately weigh the
competing interests. Although reform in local legislation and/or
international agreements would lessen the burden on the courts, there has
been no recent formal changes in Canada and it appears unlikely that
there will be any in the near future. Thus, although the policies involved
in an international insolvency dispute may be best sorted out by the
policy-makers themselves, the task at present rests with the courts.
The most recent attempt at a resolution of an international insolvency
dispute in Canada is Re Sefel Geophysical Ltd.2, (hereinafter Re Sefel).
This article will focus on the particular problems raised in Re Sefel as a
key to broader issues. In order to deal with these problems, I will detail
the facts in the Re Sefel decision and discuss the law in Canada at present
regarding the treatment of international insolvency disputes. The majority
of this paper, however, will examine the specific problems raised in Re
Sefel and suggest some alternative approaches. The final portion will
discuss the need for an ultimate solution in the form of an international
agreement or at the very least a bilateral agreement with Canada's largest
trading partner, the United States.
Prior to embarking on this analysis, it should be noted that conflict of
laws problems which occur in the adjudication of international
insolvencies do not often arise between separate provinces within
Canada. This is a consequence of the fact that bankruptcy law in Canada,
in accordance with section 91(21) of the Constitution Ac4 18673 is
2. (1988), 62 Adia. L.R. (2d) 193 (Q.B.). This decision is presently under appeal to the Alberta
Court of Appeal.
3. Mr. Justice Wurtele of the Quebec Superior Court stated in Dupon v. La Cie de Moulin a
Bardeau Chanfrene (1888), 11 L.N. 255:
It is ... in the interest of the trade and commerce of the whole dominion that there should be one
uniform law for all of the provinces, regulating proceedings in the case of insolvent debtors,
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governed by federal legislation. The Bankruptcy Act4 stipulates in section
188(1) that any order made by a court in accordance with the Act shall
be enforced "in courts having jurisdiction in bankruptcy elsewhere in
Canada". Section 188(2) further states that all courts shall "severally act
in aid of and be auxiliary to each other". As a consequence, when
international bankruptcy problems arise there is no substantial body of
intra-federal conflicts/bankruptcy law to draw on.5
II. The Facts of Re Sefel Geophysical Ltd
Sefel Geophysical Ltd., (hereinafter Sefel), carried on seismic and
geophysical activity in Canada, the United States and the United
Kingdom. In 1985 Sefel encountered some financial difficulties and a
petition was filed pursuant to the Companies' Creditors Arrangement
Act, 6 (hereinafter CCAA). In conjuction with this petition, Sefel obtained
a stay of proceedings against all creditors while the negotiations under the
CCAA were ongoing. The majority of the unsecured assets were,
however, located in the United States. Consequently, it was necessary to
obtain a similar stay in the United States to prevent the creditors who
were located in that jurisdiction from attaching the assets. Affidavits and
oral evidence were submitted to the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the district of Colorado in an attempt to obtain the stay of proceedings in
accordance with section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C.). The
effect of s. 304 was not discussed in Re Sefel, but it essentially gives the
U.S. courts remedial powers with respect to assets in the U.S. at the
behest of a foreign trustee. A Canadian lawyer also gave oral evidence as
to the effect of the CCAA. It is unclear, however, whether he provided
any evidence concerning the effects of a bankruptcy if the CCAA
solution failed.
The order was granted enjoining the U.S. creditors from taking any
action with respect to the assets in the U.S., but it must be noted that the
unrestricted in its operations by provincial boundaries; that it should be possible to obtain a
national execution, and not merely a limited provincial one, against the estate of an insolvent
debtor, who might hold property in several provinces, or transfer it from one province to another.
(from David Rubin, "Canadian Comment: The U.S. Creditors' Unfair Advantage
over Canadian Creditors" (1979), 84 Comm. L.J. 470 at p. 470)
The words of Mr. Justice Wurtele are still very pertinent with respect to international
insolvency problems. The justifications which he notes for federal jurisdiction over bankruptcy
may be used to support a move towards adopting international agreements to deal with
international insolvencies.
4. R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3.
5. As will be noted further on, provincial conflict of law rules are applicable with respect to
the validity of a debt or obligation. To this extent, it is possible to have a conflict problem in
a bankruptcy proceeding which is strictly domestic.
6. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.
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evidence given by the Canadian lawyer led the court to believe that the
U.S. creditors would receive equal treatment under the CCAA
agreement. The U.S. court was under the belief that there would be no
discrimination against creditors on the basis of origin. In addition to the
order, a document was filed entitled, "Findings of Facts and Conclusions
of Law", in which it was explicitly stated that the Bankruptcy Court was
operating under the assumption that the creditors located in the U.S.,
who would have received preferential status under American bankruptcy
laws, would receive similar status in any Canadian proceedings.
The agreement pursuant to the CCAA was never actually put into
effect and on November 28, 1985 the Royal Bank of Canada filed a
petition for bankruptcy for Sefel Geophysical Ltd. The court appointed
Clarkson Gordon Inc. as the trustee. Clarkson Gordon was able to
recover roughly $1,250,000.00 in unsecured assets, approximately
$1,130,000.00 of which was received from the liquidation of assets
located in the United States. The U.S. assets were apparently preserved
solely as a result of the stay of proceedings issued with respect to the
failed CCAA compromise. The remainder was collected from assets in
Canada. There were no unsecured assets in the United Kingdom and thus
nothing was collected from that jurisdiction.
The major issue concerned the status of the preferred creditors located
in the United States and the United Kingdom in the Canadian
bankruptcy proceeding. The claims of the U.S. creditors included, as
stated by the court, tax, workers' compensation and unemployment
insurance claims. The status of the creditors located in the United
Kingdom was not as contentious, primarily because there were no assets
in that jurisdiction. There was nothing which they could have attached to
satisfy their claims. Consequently they had no choice but to exercise
forbearance with respect to any proceedings in the United Kingdom and
voluntarily submitted to the proposed Canadian agreement and the
subsequent bankruptcy proceedings from the outset.
Thus, the Alberta Court was left with the primary question, should the
American creditors be allowed to maintain preferred status as would
have been accorded to them under American bankruptcy laws.
Predictably the problem was, however, that claims such as those which
were asserted by the American creditors are denied preferential status in
the Canadian Bankruptcy Act7. The priorities section in the Bankruptcy
7. Supra note 4, s. 136. At the time Re Sefel supra, note 2, was decided, the relevant section
was s. 107 of R.S.C. 1970, c. B-3 which provides:
107. [Priority of claims] (1) Subject to the rights of secured creditors, the proceeds realized from
the property of a bankrupt shall be applied in priority of payment as follows...
(e) municipal taxes assessed or levied against the bankrupt within two years next preceding his
bankruptcy and that do not constitute a preferential lien or charge against the real property of the
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Act grants preferential status to tax claims, workers' compensation claims
and unemployment insurance claims, but only if they are domestic. It
does not provide for the recognition of similar foreign claims. As the
majority of the U.S. preferential claimants were tax creditors of some
form, the subsequent question was whether their claims should be
recognized at all.
The preferred creditors in the United States attempted to get around
this by arguing firstly, that the doctrine of comity of nations required the
Alberta court to recognize their claims. Secondly, if comity was not
adequate, equity, more specifically the equitable remedy of unjust
enrichment, provided the court with sufficient justification for the
recognition of the claims. It should be noted that the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code affords recognition for similar foreign claims in a U.S. bankruptcy
proceeding. 8
Comity is certainly not a new concept in the adjudication of
international insolvencies. The court was able to point to a number of
American bankruptcy cases which resorted to the doctrine of comity to
resolve disputes.9 The essential problem with the application of comity is
that, according to Forsyth J., it has only been used with respect to the
recognition of foreign bankruptcy proceedings. The court was unable to
find an example where comity was used to determine priorities, which
are traditionally determined by the lexfor
Forsyth J. went on to note that the Bankruptcy Act is not the sole
source of the problem. In addition to the legislative prohibition, the
common law denies recognition of foreign revenue claims. A foreign
revenue claim is not provable in a liquidation, or in any proceeding for
that matter, and thus cannot be enforced regardless of the question of
priorities. It appears from the information provided in the written
decision that the claims of the U.S. creditors with which the court was
bankrupt, but not exceeding the value of the interest of the bankrupt in the property in respect of
which the taxes were imposed as declared by the trustee ...
(h) all indebtedness of the bankrupt under any Workmen's Compensation Act, under any
Unemployment Insurance Act, under any provision of the Income Tax Act ... creating an
obligation to pay to Her Majesty amounts that have been deducted or witheldparipassu...
(j) claims of the Crown not previously mentioned in this section, in right of Canada or of any
province, paripassu notwithstanding ant statutory preference to the contrary.
This section has not changed in any way in the recent 1985 revised edition.
8. Re Sefe supra, note 2, p. 203 The court refers to sections 726, 507 and 101(24) of the
Bankruptcy Code which if read together provide for the recognition of unsecured claims of
"governmental units". "Governmental units" is defined in s. 101(24) as including "a foreign
state".
9. Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Ltd (1979), 34 C.B.R. (N.S.) 124 (U.S.D.C.); Drexel
Burnham Lambert Group Ina v. A. W. Galadar4 610 . Supp. 114 (D.C.N.Y., 1985); Cunard
Steamship Co. v. Salen Reefer Services AB, 773 E2d 452 (U.S.C.A., 1985).
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concerned were substantially, if not wholly, claims which fall within the
classification of tax claims.1
0
Forsyth J. concluded that comity was not of any assistance. In defining
the restrictive application of comity, he stated "Comity does not allow
me to alter priorities set out in the Bankruptcy Act but it does dictate the
recognition of foreign sovereigns and governments to some extent in
liquidation proceedings."'" After rejecting comity, Forsyth J. turned to
equity for assistance. He isolated a specific rule in equity whereby money
paid by mistake of law is recoverable so as not to unjustly enrich the
estate of the bankrupt.12 In light of the fact that the U.S. creditors
refrained from attaching and realizing on the assets located in the U.S.,
which as previously stated, comprised at least 90% of the total unsecured
assets, Forsyth J. commented that it would be "grossly unfair" if at that
point they were denied any preference. He stated, "to turn around and
prevent the parties with priority to those assets from asserting similar
priority in the present proceedings seems manifestly unjust." 13
Thus the U.S. preferred creditors succeeded in obtaining preferential
status in the Canadian proceedings on the basis of a principle in equity.
It should be noted that the court also remarked that the same thing could
have been achieved through the doctrine of remedial constructive trust. 4
Similar to the equitable principle originally referred to, constructive trust
depends on the existence of unjust enrichment. It was this aspect of the
doctrine which persuaded Forsyth J. of its applicability. 15 As will become
apparent further on in this paper, there are other aspects of the doctrine
of constructive trust which cast some doubt on its suitability to the facts
in Re Sefel and to bankruptcies in general.
It logically follows that as the U.S. creditors were granted preferential
status on the basis of unjust enrichment, the U.K. creditors were denied
priority in its absence. The court stated that due to the fact there were no
unsecured assets in the U.K. available to the creditors in that jurisdiction,
Sefel's estate was not unjustly enriched at their expense. 6 The fact that
the U.K. creditors voluntarily submitted to the Canadian proceedings was
discredited as a valid consideration. The U.K. creditors were thus
relegated to the status of general creditors.
10. bid, pp. 198, 201-202. There was no discussion of claims other than those characterized
as tax claims.
11. Re Sefe supra, note 2, p. 202.
12. Condon, Re,Exparte James. 9 Ch. App. 609, [1874-80] AU E.R. 388 (C.A.).
13. Re Sefel supra, note 2, p. 20 4.
14. Petikus v. Becker, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 834.
15. Re Sefe4 supra, note 2, pp. 20 5-2 06.
16. Ibid, p. 206.
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The issues raised in Re Sefe primarily the application of comity in the
adjudication of international insolvencies, the subsequent use of equity
and the prohibition on the recognition of foreign tax claims, will all be
addressed in due course. At this point, however, I would like to review
the approach adopted by Canadian courts in general to problems
encountered in international bankruptcies. This will hopefully provide a
basis for the ensuing discussion on the problems raised in Re SefeL The
following analysis will focus on situations where a Canadian court has
accepted jurisdiction and assigned a trustee in bankruptcy. It will not deal
explicitly with the recognition in Canada of claims of foreign trustees,
although references to recognition issues will occasionally be made.
III. Canadian Adjudication of an International Insolvency
The adjudication of an insolvency, regardless of the presence of foreign
facts, may be approached or characterized in three separate ways.17 The
"judgment approach" emphasizes the declaratory nature of a bankruptcy
adjudication. In accordance with this approach, the recognition of a
Canadian bankruptcy proceeding in a foreign jurisdiction would simply
be a matter of the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment. In
the second approach, bankruptcy proceedings are primarily viewed as a
means to collect and preserve assets for distribution to various established
creditors. It entails focusing on creditor's remedies over and above any
other interests. This results in an extremely protective approach towards
creditors within a particular jurisdiction. Consequently, if a court in a
foreign jurisdiction maintained this position, it would not recognize a
Canadian proceeding if it thought such proceedings might prejudice the
rights of domesticc ditors.
The final approach, in which a bankruptcy is viewed as a general
assignment of the assets of an insolvent to the creditors is, not
surprisingly, referred to as the "general assignment approach". The
emphasis of this approach is on the transfer of property."8 This is the
approach most commonly adopted in common law jurisdictions and
specifically in Canada.19
If we accept that the "general assignment" approach is followed in the
adjudication of bankruptcies in Canada it is somewhat difficult to
determine what type of approach a court would take in dealing with an
insolvency involving foreign creditors or property in a foreign
17. R.N. Robertson, "Enforcement and Other Problems in International Insolvencies",
(1985), The Meredith Lectures (McGill University) 266 at p. 267.
18. bid, p. 267.
19. Ibid, p. 267.
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jurisdiction. Although it is clear in adopting this approach that all assets
are assigned to the trustee for the benefit of the creditors, it does not
provide any assistance as to what law should apply to foreign assets and
how to deal with the prospect of non-recognition. One might consider
that as title to all assets vests in one entity, the law of the jurisdiction in
which that entity is situated should govern everything. In other words the
estate would be administered in accordance with the concept of
universality. R.N. Robertson describes this concept as follows:
When a country professes that its decrees are entitled to recognition
internationally, because unity of insolvency, equality of treament of
foreign and domestic creditors, application of common rules with respect
to transactions before and after adjudication, effective relief of the
insolvent and economy of administration are desirable, that is
universality.20
This would appear to be a logical extension of the "general assignment
approach". There is, however, some indication that territoriality, which is
derived from the doctrine of the sovereignty of nations, plays a part in
resolving disputes encountered in international insolvencies. In the field
of international insolvencies, this would provide that proceedings in one
jurisdiction would not effect creditors or assets in another jurisdiction.21
Any state which adopts the creditors' remedies approach to bankruptcy
proceedings would necessarily view an international insolvency from a
territorial perspective.
Canadian courts do not consistently adjudicate international
insolvencies on the basis of either universality or territoriality. There is
essentially no uniformity in approach. Rather, the Canadian approach to
international bankruptcies, most likely out of necessity considering the
diversity in bankruptcy laws throughout the world, is essentially referred
to as the plurality doctrine.22 This is a compromise between the two basic
philosophical perspectives, universality and territoriality. The plurality
doctrine proceeds from the premise that bankruptcies should essentially
be an extension of the private law which exists between the insolvent
debtor and the creditors. In keeping with this, it is acceptable under the
plurality doctrine to initiate separate bankruptcy proceedings in different
jurisdictions if necessary. Each court would, accordingly apply its own
substantive law to the proceedings initiated within its jurisdiction.
23
There are a few other theories which relate specifically to the
adjudication of an international insolvency which should be mentioned.
20. /bid, p. 266-267.
21. kid, p. 267.
22. J.G. Castel, Canadian Conflict of Laws, (2d) (Toronto: Butterworths, 1986), p. 490-491.
23. Ibid, pp. 490-491.
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These doctrines or theories are acknowledged and discussed by numerous
authors including Castel in his text, Canadian Conflict of Laws.24 The
first theory which Castel identifies, "unity of bankruptcy" was previously
referred to in the discussion on universality. The doctrine, "unity of
bankruptcy", provides that one court, usually the court of the domicile of
the debtor, determines all of the issues and its decisions are to be
universally accepted. 25 Whether jurisdiction is assumed on the basis of
the domicile of the debtor or some other factor, for example, wherever
the majority of the assets are located, would depend on the distinct
bankruptcy laws of each jurisdiction. Castel comments that this approach
is impractical given the diversity in bankruptcy laws and the fact that
such laws are most often viewed as an extension of state policy.
26
The second theory which Castel comments on is the "doctrine of
priority". This provides for the exclusion of all proceedings except the
one initiated first time. The administrator appointed in such proceedings
would take priority over the claims of any other subsequently appointed
administrator regardless of the location of the assets. Castel states that this
doctrine simply has no rational basis and is not considered an acceptable
approach in Canada.27
Castel is, therefore, fully in favour of the "doctrine of plurality". He
states, "the doctrine of plurality is the only one in which the policy of a
state with respect to bankruptcy can be preserved and implemented." 28 In
spite of the fact that he considers it the best approach, he does discuss
numerous difficulties with the application of this doctrine. One such
difficulty is that it does not provide an easy solution to the question
should the claims of foreign creditors be admitted on the same basis as
24. ibid, p. 489.
25. Kurt Nadelmann comments in a number of articles, including "Solomon v. Ross and
International Bankruptcy" (1946), 9 Mod. L.Rev. 153 and "International Bankruptcy Law Its
Present Status" (1943-44), 5 U. of Toronto L.J. 324, that in spite of the fact there is a general
assignment of all assets to the trustee in English and Canadian law, "unity of bankruptcy" is
certainly not a commonly adopted approach. Regardless of the fact that both of these articles
were written a number of years ago, it appears that these statements are still applicable today.
In Re Artola Hermanos (1890), 24 Q.B.D. 640, Fry J. commented on the "unity of
bankruptcy" doctrine as follows:
"Another rule which has been suggested is this, that every other forum shall yield to the forum
of the domicile, for the forum of every foreign country, every country not of the domicile, shall
act only as accessory and in aid of the forum of the domicile. That, it is said, is forum
concursus, to which all persons interested in the administration of the estate are bound to have
recourse. No doubt there is a great deal in point of law and principle to be said in favour of
that view, and there are certainly some conveniences in it." (As cited in R.H. Graveson,
Conflict of Laws, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1974), p. 547.
26. Castel, supr, note 22, p. 49 0.
27. !bid, p. 491. Graveson, supra, note 25, discusses this in more detail at pp. 548-549.
28. Castel, supra, note 22, p. 490.
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local creditors29 ; precisely the problem which existed in Re SefeL The
next logical step is therefore to examine the bankruptcy laws in Canada
to determine whether they provide any guidance with respect to such
problems. It should be noted, however, before I proceed with an analysis
of Canadian bankruptcy law, that the U.S. creditors would have been
fully within their powers to initiate proceedings in the U.S. in the absence
of the stay, which was a product of American bankruptcy policy,
particularly in light of the amount of unsecured assets which were located
in that jurisdiction. This would apparently have been acceptable to a
Canadian court if it was to abide by the "doctrine of plurality".
The first issue to confront in dealing with international bankruptcies is
jurisdiction. When will a Canadian court assume jurisdiction over an
insolvent debtor? In accordance with section 43(5) of the Bankruptcy
Act, a court will take jurisdiction if it is in "the locality of the debtor".
This is defined as:
(a) where the debtor has carried on business during the year
immediately preceding his bankruptcy,
(b) where the debtor has resided during the year immediately preceding
his bankruptcy,
(c) in cases not coming within paragraph (a) or (b) where the greater
portion of the property of the debtor is situated.30
Thus in order to assume jurisdiction a Canadian court must be able to
point to a substantial contact between the operations of the business or
individual and a Canadian jurisdiction. The contact must not be merely
occasional. 31 It is important to note that a Canadian court will not take
jurisdiction merely on the basis of the presence of assets.32 The CCAA
29. The other two difficulties which Castel points out at p. 491 are: 1. the territorial scope of
local bankruptcy laws are not easy to determine and, 2. to what extent should foreign
administrators be recognized and does it matter whether proceedings were initiated before or
after notice of the foreign administrator.
30. Supra, note 4, s. 2.
31. Robertson, supra, note 17, p. 270. Robertson further comments, however, that the
presence of an administrative office usually constitutes adequate contact.
32. The converse of this position is that in a foreign bankruptcy, a Canadian court will usually
turn over assets, even if they have already been attached or garnished, to a foreign trustee. The
first case to determine this conflict rule was Solomons v. Ross which is discussed in Nadelmann
"Solomons v. Ross ... ", supra, note 25. Nadelmann also discusses this rule, or perhaps it is
better described as an approach, in "Bankruptcy in Canada: Assets in N.Y. (1962), 11 Am. J.
of Comp. Law 628 at p. 630.
As noted in footnote 25, "unity of bankruptcy" is not consistently adopted in Canadian or
English bankruptcy law and it appears to simply be a matter of discretion whether a court
adopts the rule in Solomons v. Ross.. A foreign trustee's title to assets will prevail if the foreign
bankruptcy was declared prior to the attachment of the assets in Canada: Williams v. Rice
[1926] 3 D.L.R. 225 (Man. Q.B.). If, however, the assets are attached prior to the foreign
declaration, a Canadian court may permit the Canadian creditors or a trustee to retain the
proceeds from the attachment: Galbraith v. Grimshaw, [1910] A.C. 508 (H.L.).
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does, however, provide a jurisdictional basis on the mere presence of
assets.33 If a foreign court were to assume jurisdiction over an insolvent
debtor on the basis of an insufficient connection, for example, the
corporation was neither incorporated, nor carrying on business in the
jurisdiction, a Canadian court would probably refuse to recognize the
foreign trustee's title to any assets situated in Canada and appoint a
Canadian trustee to deal with such assets.34 The connection must,
however, in this instance be extremely deficient.
Once a Canadian court accepts juridiction, a trustee is appointed. The
Bankruptcy Act provides that title to all assets, regardless of where they
are situated, is assigned to the trustee in bankruptcy.3 5 This very broad
scope of power over the bankrupt's assets may not necessarily be of any
assistance to the trustee. Although a Canadian trustee may claim title to
assets outside of Canada, there is no guarantee that such title will be
recognized by the foreign authorities. The trustee must further recognize
and abide by any procedural formalities which are required to transfer
title in the jurisdiction where the assets are located. Otherwise, title will
simply not vest in the trustee. The attitude adopted in the U.S. in the past
to foreign trustees clearly exemplifies the problems which may be
encountered.
The U.S. courts have historically displayed a considerable amount of
protectionism over its domestic creditors. American courts have shown
no reservation in permitting local creditors to attach or garnish assets of
a foreign debtor located within the jurisdiction in spite of the fact that a
foreign trustee has been appointed. This was the case even if the foreign
trustee was appointed prior to the attachment. American courts were
more or less hostile to foreign administrators claiming assets located in
the U.S.36 This has been referred to as the "race of diligence" system
It should further be noted that U.S. law does permit a court to assume jurisdiction to initiate
bankruptcy proceedings merely on the basis of the presence of assets.
33. Supra, note 6, s. 2.
34. Schemmer v. Property Resources Ltd., [1974] 3 All E.R. 451 (Ch.) In this case, a British
court stated that an American court lacked jurisdiction to appoint a trustee for a corporation
that was neither incorporated nor doing business in the U.S.
35. Supra; note 4, ss. 17(2), 67(c), (d) and 2.
36. The best example of this approach can be found in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in
Harrison v. Sterry 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289 (1809). The case is discussed in detail in Stefan A.
Riesenfeld, "The Status of Foreign Administrators of Insolvent Estates: A Comparative
Survey" (1976), 24 Am. J. of Comp. Law, 288 at pp. 290-292. It is interesting to note that in
spite of the fact that this was the standard approach in the U.S. until quite recently, it was not
the position which Mr. Justice Story advocated. In his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws
(1834), Story praised the ubiquity approach of the British courts and commented that comity
required recognition of extraterritorial effect of foreign bankruptcy laws.
A recent example of this protective approach can be found in the case of Re Toga
ManufacturingLtd 28 Bankr. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich, 1983).
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which is more or less "first-there, first-served". 37 This is also obviously the
problem which is raised in Re Sefel The Canadian trustee had, by virtue
of the assignment in bankruptcy full title, at least in the eyes of Canadian
law, to the assets of Sefel which were located in the U.S. The U.S.
creditors were not, however, obliged to recognize that title in the absence
of the stay. They might have seized the assets to satisfy their claims or
appointed their own trustee in bankruptcy to deal with such assets.38
They were however, forced to respect the Canadian proceedings as a
result of the stay, issued pursuant to section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code.
This section, which has the potential to bring about a dramatic change in
the U.S. approach, will be discussed further on in this paper.
If a foreign creditor successfully attaches the assets of an insolvent
which are located within the jurisdiction, but such assets are insufficient
to satisfy the debt, it is possible for the creditor to make a claim pursuant
to any bankruptcy proceedings in Canada. The creditor will, however, be
unable to claim anything unless he releases to the trustee the amount
which has already been obtained in the foreign jurisdiction. This is
referred to as the "hotchpotch rule".
39
In determining the validity of a debt or obligation involving a foreign
party, the rules applicable are those which would normally apply within
the Province.40 In other words, the validity of a debt would be
determined by the conflict of law rules in force in that province. Thus, in
most common law jurisdictions, a contractual debt obligation will be
determined by the proper law of the contract. The actual administration
and distribution of the insolvent's estate would however, be governed by
Canadian federal law in a Canadian bankruptcy proceeding as the lex
forL 41 This is simply an extension of the general conflict of laws rule that
all matters of procedure are governed by the lexfori 42 The priority rules
which must be followed for the distribution of funds are those found in
section 136 of the Bankruptcy AcL
43
37. Nadelmann, "Solomons v. Ross..." supra, note 25, p. 282; Nadelmann, "Assumption of
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents" (1966), 41 Tul. L.Rev. 75 at p. 77; Rubin,
"Canadian Comment.. ", supra, note 3, p. 471.
38. As previously noted, the U.S. the Bankruptcy Code permits the taking of jurisdiction
merely on the basis of the presence of assets. Kurt Nadelmann discusses the problems which
this creates and the evolution of the U.S. Bankruptcy laws in this respect in, "A Reflection on
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: News from the European Economic Community, the United States
and Canada" (1982), 27 McGill L.J. 541.
39. Castel, supra; note 22, p. 499; Graveson, supra, note 25, discusses this in more detail at
p. 554.
40. Re Viscount Supply Co. Ltd, [1963] 1 O.R. 640 (S.C. in bankruptcy).
41. Castel, supra, note 22, p. 495 .
42. Huber v. Steiner (1835), 132 E.R. 80 (C.P.).
43. This section is identical to section 107 of the previous revised edition of the Bankruptcy
Act which was used in Re Sefel and which is detailed in note 8.
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Within this framework foreign creditors are theoretically treated the
same as Canadian creditors. Re Sefel obviously provides an example of
how this does not necessarily occur in practice. If one closely examines
the wording of the priority section, subsections (e), (h) and (j) when read
together, indicate quite clearly, as was pointed out in Re Sefel, that
foreign tax claims, workers' compensation claims and unemployment
insurance claims are not recognized or granted the same preferential
status as are identical domestic claims.44 Subsection (j) refers to "claims
of the Crown not previously mentioned in subsections (a) to (i) in right
of Canada or of any province ... " This implies that the categories of
preferential claims in subsections (a) to (i) are restricted to purely
domestic claims. This is most likely an extension of the common law rule
which prohibits recognition of foreign revenue claims. The appropriate-
ness of this rule today, more particularly in the context of bankruptcies,
will be addressed later in this paper. Within the Bankruptcy Act itself,
however, this creates a somewhat anomalous situation. Title to all of the
assets in the U.S. are vested in the trustee and yet there is no recognition
of the claims of the creditors located within that jurisdiction. They are
denied preferential status by the Bankruptcy Act and further denied any
recognition under the common law.
Irrespective of the agreed upon "Findings of Fact and Conclusion of
Law" in Re Sefel which assumed that the U.S. creditors would receive a
status similar to that which they would have received under U.S.
bankruptcy laws, the situation presented in the Bankruptcy Act is
inconsistent for a number of reasons. To begin with, the claims of the-
American creditors would have been recognized and granted preferential
status under the Bankruptcy Code if concurrent proceedings were
initiated in the U.S. where the vast majority of the unsecured assets were
located.45 Concurrent proceedings are, if necessary, certainly acceptable
as an alternative method for dealing with an insolvent debtor who has
assets in a foreign jurisdiction.46 It seems illogical and inefficient that the
claims of the American creditors are not recognized solely because the
proceedings are situated in Canada when there are other means by which
those same claims could be recognized.
Secondly, although bankruptcy laws are often considered an extension
of state policy,47 this appears to interfere with the whole purpose of
44. Re Sefe supra, note 2, p. 201-202.
45. Ibid, p. 203. Sections 726, 507(7) and 101(24) would give preferential status to the
creditors' claims in the U.S. As stated in note 8, they would also recognize foreign claims of
a similar nature.
46. Re E.H. Clarke & Co; Trustee v. Royal Bank of Canada, [1923] 1 D.L.R. 716 (Ont. S.C.).
47. Castel, supra, note 22, p. 490.
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assigning title to all of the assets of the debtor to the trustee, regardless of
where they are located. It is obvious that the scope of the assignment is
to facilitate an equitable and just distribution of an insolvent's assets to all
of the creditors. To allow a Canadian trustee to assume title over all of the
assets in the U.S. and simultaneously not require the recognition of the
majority of the claims from that jurisdiction flies in the face of justice and
common sense. If the U.S. court which issued the stay was aware of the
true situation, it would most likely not have granted the stay of
proceedings which was obviously beneficial to the Canadian creditors.
This is, furthermore, most likely not a unique occurence; I would
speculate the majority of bankruptcies include some type of tax claim.
The Alberta Court recognized the inequity of this situation and
attempted to search for a way to circumvent the prohibition in the
Bankruptcy Act and the common law against foreign tax claims. The
court examined two arguments for this purpose as presented by the
American creditors. This first argument was based on the doctrine of
comity. Comity is a doctrine which, oddly enough, does not arise very
often in conflict of law problems. It does not appear in any of the cases
which provide the foundation for conflict of law rules. It does, however,
appear to be used quite frequently in specific types of cases, most notably
cases involving the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments,
issues pertaining to evidence rules and procedures, anti-suit injunctions
and international insolvencies. It is more or less a last resort doctrine in
that it is used when the applicable rules or legislation do not give rise to
an equitable solution. To this extent, it resembles the concept of equity;
but it is unique in that it focuses on problems arising out of the interaction
of two jurisdictions. Given the inadequacies of the present Bankruptcy
Act to deal with foreign facts in international insolvencies and the lack of
any substantial uniformity of law in this field on an international level, or
for that matter between the United States and Canada, comity may be a
very useful tool.
IV. Comity
The concept of comity has been around much longer than the defined
body of rules known as conflict of laws. Hessel Yntema in his article,
"The Comity Doctrine", traces the origins of this doctrine to the
Netherlands in the late seventeenth century.48 He states at the outset of his
article that, "[t]he doctrine of comity for the first time posed in stark
48. Hessel Yntema, "The Comity Doctrine" (1966), 65 Mich. L.R. 9 at p. 9. I do not intend
to discuss this article in detail, but it does provide a fundamental picture of the philosophical
development and role of the comity doctrine in private international law.
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simplicity the basic doctrine of conflicts law in modem times to mediate
between the pretensions of territorial sovereignty and the needs of
international commerce.
' 49
Yntema supports the proposition that the origin of the principles of
private international law, specifically in the area of international trade
and commercial disputes, which would encompass international
insolvencies, may be found in the doctrine of comity.50 In addition to
discussing the historical relationship between comity and private
international law principles, Yntema further advocates the resurrection of
the doctrine of comity to address the problems created by the "plurality
of national laws."
This opinion is by no means universally recognized. Dicey & Morris
have probably been most vocal in rejecting comity as a basis for conflict
of law rules. In Dicey's original treatise on private international law,
which was entitled Law of Domicile, his rejection of comity is juxtaposed
to his acceptance of the vested-right theory:
the application of foreign law is not a matter of caprice or option, it does
not arise from the desire of the sovereign of England, or of any other
sovereign, to show courtesy to other states. It flows from the impossibility
of otherwise determining whole classes of cases without gross
inconveniences and injustice to litigants, whether natives or foreigners.51
In spite of the fact that the most recent edition of Dicey & Morris has
abandoned the vested-right theory,52 they continue to reject comity as a
basis for private international law.5 3 As a consequence of this rejection by
these and other influential authors, comity has not been widely utilized in
private international disputes. Although in its present day use, courts have
consistently rejected the notion that reciprocity is a pre-condition for its
application,54 it necessarily implies some element of reciprocity and, as
49. b , p. 9.
50. Ibid, p. 20. Yntema refers to E.M. Meijers for this proposition, who is the author of a
comprehensive history of the fundamentals of Private International Law: LHistoire des
Principes Fondamentaux du Droit International Prive.
51. Cited in, Graveson, "Philosophical Aspects of the English Conflict of Laws" (1962), 78
L.Q. Rev. 337 at p. 344.
52. The vested-right theory toward conflict of laws was apparently very popular in the earlier
stages of the development of conflict of laws principles and was the approach adopted by the
First Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1934). The Second Restatement has, however, dropped
this original approach and adopted a more "interpretive" approach. (see Willis Reese,
"Conflict of Laws and Restatement Second", Perspectives on Conflict of Laws, (Toronto:
Little, Brown and Company, 1980) p. 42.
53. Graveson, "Philosophical Aspects..." supra, note 51, p. 345.
54. See R.H. Webb, "Comity and Reciprocity" (1966), 15 Int'l and Comp. L.Q. 269. In this
article, the author discusses a decision in which a comity and reciprocity approach was
rejected. The case involved the recognition of a Belgian judgment. It is clear from this case and
the article that reciprocity plays no part in at least the recognition of foreign in personam
judgments.
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another conflict of laws scholar notes, "the absence of a state of war".55
These simply are not suitable premises for the resolution of private
disputes.
Comity may, however, be appropriate in cases which are on the
frontier between private international law and public law. That is cases
which concern interests beyond those of private individuals and which
involve state policies. It is thus apparent why comity has primarily been
considered in the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, 56
anti-suit injunctions,57 evidentiary disputes and international insolvencies.
In an anti-suit injunction application, a court is not merely concerned
with the interest of the individual parties. It must consider the sovereign
immunity of another judicial system and the interests of the state in
sanctioning such proceedings. Vaughan Black comments in an article
which discusses the appropriateness of comity in anti-suit injunctions in
Canada that comity implies a certain amount of deference.5 8 This is
necessary in proceedings which may potentially spark political disputes if
competing state interests are disregarded. As the English Court of Appeal
has stated, comity is "shorthand for good neighbourliness, common
courtesy and mutual respect between those who labour in adjoining
judicial vineyards." 59
Given this explanation of the appropriate use of comity, it is not
surprising that it also arises in cases involving evidentiary disputes. One
of the leading cases in Canada in which the doctrine of comity was
employed is Zingre v. R. 60 In this case a Swiss court was requesting the
issuance of a commission to an "investigating officer" in Switzerland.
There was a question as to whether the request violated Canadian
evidence law based on the fact the order emanated from an "investigating
officer" rather than a court or tribunal. It should be noted that the Swiss
proceedings which precipitated the order were originally at the request of
the Canadian Minister of Justice and involved an issue which arose in
Canada. The issues were obviously not restricted to the interests of the
private parties to the original proceedings in Switzerland and required
some deference to the Swiss judicial system. Thus the principle of comity
55. Graveson, "Philosphical Aspects..." supra, note 51, p. 364.
56. Henfrey Samson Belair Ltd v. Carter (1988), 29 C.P.C.(2d) 150 (Ont. H.C.).
57. Black, "The Antisuit Injunction Comes to Canada" (1988), 13 Queen's L. J. 103.
58. bid, p. 119.
59. British Airways Bd v. Laker Airways, [1984] 1 Q.B. 169 at pp. 185-186 (C.A.), as cited
in R.W.R. "Anti-Suit Injunctions and International Comity", (1985), V.A. Law Rev. 1039 at
p. 1064.
60. [19811 2 S.C.R. 392. See as well Re Mulroney and Coates (1986), 54 O.R. (2d)
353 (H.C.).
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was employed to allow the "investigating officer" to proceed with the
inquiry.
Within this context, it is not difficult to comprehend the role that
comity can and has played in international insolvencies. 61 It has,
however, as noted in Re Sefel, appeared more in international
bankruptcy proceedings in the United States than in Canada. It has also
been used primarily with reference to the recognition and enforcement of
foreign bankruptcy proceedings. In each instance, the U.S. courts have
adopted the same definition of comity as expressed in Hilton v. Guyotr
62
the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard
both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of laws.63
One of the earlier cases in which comity was applied is Canadian
Southern Railroad v. Gebhard64 This case, similar to many others in
which comity has been used, involved an attempt to circumvent a
Canadian arrangement pursuant to Canadian laws by attaching assets
located in the United States. The court stated in that case that there is an
actual presumption that U.S. courts should defer to bankruptcy
proceedings in other jurisdictions provided they were relatively just.
The court in Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen,65 a case involving an attempt
by a Canadian trustee in bankruptcy to take possession of corporate
records located in a New York office, pursuant to a statutory duty under
the Bankruptcy Act and against the wishes of U.S. directors, made a
number of similar observations. The court, however, in that case also
singled out the special relationship which exists between Canada and the
U.S. and stated that Canada is a "sister common law jurisdiction with
procedures akin to our own." This special relationship appears to have
facilitated the application of comity in that case as well as in a number
of other cases.66 Various other cases in the U.S. have made very broad
statements regarding the application of comity. These statements reflect
the fact that comity is certainly not limited to situations where a special
61. ReITT(1975), 80.R. (2d) 359, 19 C.B.R. (N.S.) 263, 58 D.L.R. (3d) 55 (H.C.); Re C.A.
Kennedy Co. and Stibbe-Monk Ltd (1976), 14 O.R. (2d) 439,23 C.B.R. (N.S.) 81 (Div. Ct.).
62. 159 U.S. 113 (1895, U.S.S.C.).
63. Ibid, p. 164.
64. 109 U.S. 527 (1883). The court stated at p. 539, "Unless all parties in interest, wherever
they reside, can be bound by the arrangement which it is sought to have legalized the scheme
may fail... Under these circumstances the true spirit of international comity requires that
schemes of this character, legalized at home, should be recognized in other countries."
65. (1976), 23 C.B.R. (N.S.) 278 (U.S.C.A. 2nd Circ.).
66. InternationalFirearms v. Kingston 6 N.Y. 2d 406 (1959).
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relationship exists. In Somnoportex Ltd v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum
Corp. 67 the court stated:
Although more than mere courtesy and accommodation, comity does
not achieve the force of an imperative obligation. Rather it is a nation's
expression of understanding which demonstrates due regard both to
international duty and convenience and to the rights of persons protected
by its own laws. Comity should be withheld only when its acceptance
would be contrary or prejudicial to the interests of the nation called upon
to give it effect.6
8
In International Hotel Corp. v. Golden,69 the court again reaffirmed the
existence of a presumption in favour of comity in stating that it applies
unless it would result in the "approval of a transaction which is inherently
vicious, wicked or immoral, and shocking to the prevailing moral
sense." 7
0
This rather liberal approach to comity was also exemplified in the
Drexel v. Galadrft case which was noted in the Re Sefel decision. In this
case a New York court was being asked to concede to bankruptcy
proceedings initiated in Dubai on the basis of comity. The court stated in
that instance that even if the Dubai proceedings arrived at a different
result than what would most likely be the result in the United States,
comity is still applicable. The basis for this decision appears to have been
the fact that the premise and goals of the proceedings were similar to
those in the U.S..
Although in the Drexel case, as in numerous others, reciprocity was
essentially rejected as a prerequisite for the application of comity,72 there
does appear to be a requisite element of similarity in the laws of the
foreign jurisdiction and the laws of the forum prior to the application of
comity. This was implicit in Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Ltd, 73 in
which it was held that comity requires recognition of Canadian
proceedings because of the similarity in the policies which underlie both
the U.S. and Canadian bankruptcy laws. The court particularly
emphasized the fact that the creditor in question would receive adequate
protection in the Canadian proceedings.
67. 453 E 2d 435 (3rd Circ. 1971).
68. Ibid, p. 440.
69. 15 N.Y. 2d 9 (1964).
70. Ibid, p. 13.
71. Supra; note 9.
72. Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transalantique, 242 N.Y. 381 at 387: comity "therefore
rests, not on the basis of reciprocity, but rather upon the persuasiveness of the foreign
judgment."
73. Supra, note 9.
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It is apparent from these cases that comity is pervasive in U.S.
international decisions. Comity has, in fact recently been codified in
section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.74 This was, as previously
mentioned, the legislative basis upon which the stay of proceedings was
issued in Re SefeL Section 304 was specifically designed to resolve
disputes in international bankruptcies where there is property or a party
located in the U.S."5 This section permits a foreign trustee to file a petition
to provide for the administration of assets within the U.S. and to prevent
creditors from within that jurisdiction from dismembering those assets
from the estate. The section further provides guidelines for determining
the appropriateness of a particular remedy. One of these guidelines,
found in section 304(c)(5), explicitly provides for the recognition of
comity in considering an application pursuant to that section. Although
74. Section 304: Cases Ancillary to Foreign Proceedings
(a) A case ancillary to a foreign proceeding is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy
court of a petition under this section by a foreign representative.
(b) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, if a party in interest does not
timely controvert the petition, or after trial, the court may:
(1) enjoin the commencement or continuation of:
(A) any action against:
(i) a debtor with respect to property involved in such foreign proceedings; or
(ii) such property; or
(B) the enforcement of any judgment against the debtor with respect to such property, or any
act or the commencement or continuation of any judicial proceeding to create or enforce a lien
against the property of such estate;
(2) order turnover of the property of such estate, or the proceeds of such property, to such
foreign representative; or
(3) order another appropriate relief.
(c) In determining whether to grant relief under subsection (b) of this section, the court shall
be guided by what will best assure an economical and expeditious administration of such
estate, consistent with:
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such estate;
(2) protection of all claim holders in the United States against such prejudice and
inconvenience in the processing of claims in such foreign proceedings;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with the order
prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the individual that such
foreign proceeding concerns.
75. Bruce Leonard, Jay A. Carfagnini and Professor Richard McLaren, "Can there be
International Cooperation in Foreign Bankruptcies?: A Canadian Examination of Some
Alternative Models" (1988), 3 Rev. of Int'l. Bus. 23. In addition, this article outlines the
purpose and application of Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code which provides "an alternative
method for a foreign trustee to manage and protect the U.S. assets of the foreign debtor by
permitting the foreign trustee to start an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding in the U.S."
(p. 33). The authors suggest that this may be a more useful approach to dealing with
international insolvencies in the absence of a treaty or uniform legislation which are obviously
the most appropriate solutions.
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the purpose of the section was to further creditor equality, it does not
completely legislate away protectionism. Section 304(c)(2) sets out a
competing principle recognizing the need for "protection of claim holders
in the U.S. against prejudice and inconvenience". Thus the dispute
between creditor equality and protectionism has not disappeared in the
U.S., but section 304 does indicate a definite move towards a more
internationally acceptable approach.
76
In one of the leading and most recent cases in the U.S. on international
insolvencies, Cunard Steamship Co. v. Salen Reefers77 the court quoted
from a House Report on this section of the Bankruptcy Code as follows:
Principles of international comity and respect for judgments and laws of
other nations suggest that the court be permitted to make appropriate
orders under all of the circumstances of each case, rather than being
provided with inflexible rules.
78
Perhaps one of the most persuasive indications of the willingness of the
U.S. courts to lend support and recognition to foreign proceedings
through the application of comity is also found in the Cunard Steamship
case. In that case it was explicitly stated that comity has a unique purpose
in bankruptcies. It "enables the assets of a debtor to be dispersed in an
equitable, orderly and systematic manner, rather than in an erratic
haphazard piecemeal fashion." 79 This certainly recognizes, and
encourages through the application of comity, the advantages to be
gained from the resolution of a bankruptcy in an single jurisdiction.80 Not
only does this make eminently good sense, it appears to propose an
expansion of the application of the doctrine of comity beyond the simple
recognition of foreign proceedings.
It is surely quite safe to assume that one of the primary purposes in
bankruptcy proceedings is to insure that whatever assets remain in the
insolvent's possession at the date of bankruptcy are distributed in an
equitable and just manner. 81 Although concurrent proceedings are an
acceptable alternative for dealing with foreign assets or parties, restricting
the administration of the entire estate to one jurisdiction certainly
facilitates this purpose. It is apparent as stated at the outset, that most
76. ibid, pp. 29-32. The authors further suggest that in enacting this section, the U.S.
authorities were hoping that other nations, specifically Canada, would also adopt a similar
clause thus enabling some uniformity in approach. This is according to the authors, however,
not an ideal approach and probably should not be adopted in Canada.
77. Supra, note9.
78. Ibid, p. 455.
79. Ibid, p. 458.
80. This was also explicitly recognized in the Cornfeld supra, decision as being a legitimate
goal in bankruptcy proceedings.
81. Stewart v. LePage (1916), 53 S.C.R. 337.
432 The Dalhousie Law Journal
nations would advance this same general purpose. To employ comity
where necessary to promote this purpose would appear to be in line with
Yntema's suggestion. Comity would be utilized to effect a more equitable
solution encompassing broad international principles.
In light of the fact that comity, as stated in Cunard Steamship, can be
used to reach an equitable result and one which embodies the basic
purpose of a bankruptcy, it seems somewhat odd that the Alberta Court
did not consider extending its application in Re Sefel to, at the very least,
the recognition of the U.S. claims. Forsyth J. was obviously searching for
a way around the statutory prohibition of the U.S. claims and yet
ultimately rejected comity as a viable approach on the basis that it is
restricted to the recognition and enforcement of foreign bankruptcy
proceedings. If one accepts Yntema's characterization of comity, it is
contrary to the principle itself to restrict it with formal rules of
application. Forsyth J. stated that principles of comity are to
provide for the recognition of foreign liquidation proceedings in the
interest of distributing the assets of a debtor in a manner that is orderly,
efficient and fair. Comity itself does not allow the judicial rewording of
local bankruptcy statutes to adopt pieces of legislation to the demands of
international trade.82
Mr. Justice Forsyth's position, as conveyed in the above statement
certainly bears some merit, but in using equity to recognize the U.S.
claims, he is doing exactly that which he refused to do through comity:
re-word the legislation to "satisfy the demands of international trade".
The question which remains is whether or not the principle in equity
which the court applied was actually more appropriate in the
circumstances.
V. Equity: A Viable Alternative to Comity?
Mr. Justice Forsyth relied on the case of Re Condon; Ex parte James83
in which money was voluntarily paid to a trustee under mistake of law.
Mistake of law is normally not a sufficient ground upon which money
paid may be recovered. The court stated in that instance, however, that
a trustee in bankruptcy is "in truth an officer of the court and the money
he holds are trust funds." Thus, if it arises that such funds actually belong
to someone else, "the court ought to do equity just as anyone else would
82. Re Sefe supra, note 2, p. 201.
83. [1874-1880] All E.R. 388 (C.A.). In this case, the claimant succeeded in obtaining an
execution against the bankrupt and was paid over the proceeds of the sale of the bankrupt's
goods, prior to the declaration of bankruptcy. On being advised that he was obliged to pay
over the money to the trustee in bankruptcy, he did so only to subsequently discover that he
was under no such legal obligation.
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be bound to do, and order the money to be paid to persons entitled to
it."'84 If Sefel's estate was permitted to disregard the U.S. claims, there
would undoubtedly be an element of unjust enrichment. I am not sure,
however, that the stay of proceedings can be accurately described as a
voluntary payment, or even an involuntary payment of money. This
would presume that the U.S. creditors were actually in possession of the
U.S. assets as opposed to only maintaining a right to such assets.
Furthermore, the principle enunciated in Exparte James was concerned
with a purely domestic bankruptcy. Although this would not preclude the
use of this doctrine in an international situation, it does become
important if one is deciding whether equity is a more appropriate
doctrine than comity. The mistake of law which the court relied on in this
instance must necessarily be the reliance on the evidence adduced at the
stay proceedings in the U.S. as it must be something distinct from the
experience of the U.K. creditors. This being the case, surely the
transnational character of the problem assumes greater relevance. The
mistake concerned the nature of Canadian bankruptcy laws. Comity
appears to be more tailored to dealing with transnational problems, in
comparison to the principle raised in Ex parte James. Comity more
keenly recognizes the unique interest of a foreign creditor and the
underlying reasons why such interests should be considered. Further-
more, it could be stated that comity is more or less a very broad equitable
principle applicable to international disputes. Hessel Yntema intimates in
his article that comity was actually founded on equity.85
As an alternative to this principle in equity, Mr. Justice Forsyth
proposes an analysis based on "remedial constructive trust principles". In
doing so, he not surprisingly focuses on the unjust enrichment ingredient
as dealt with by the Supreme Court of Canada in Pettkus v. Becker.86
Through an anlysis that is similar, albeit briefer, than the one previously
discussed, Mr. Justice Forsyth arrives at the conclusion that a
"constructive trust remedy is appropriate on these particular facts". The
constructive trust doctrine would appear, however, to be less appropriate
than the principle expounded in Ex parte James with respect to
international insolvencies. The beneficiary of a constructive trust, the U.S.
creditors in this instance, would actually acquire an equitable title in the
funds themselves under this doctrine. To find the existence of a
constructive trust it is necessary to first isolate property to which it can
attach because the "constructive trust is a proprietary remedy, that is it
84. Ibid, p. 390.
85. Yntema, supra, note 48, p. 12.
86. [198012 S.C.R. 834.
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lies with respect to property."87 A mere right to establish a claim to
property arising out of a debt does not constitute a proprietary right. A
creditor/debtor relationship is not the same, nor does it set up the same
rights as a trustee/beneficiary relationship. Take for example the
distinction between a secured and unsecured claim in a bankruptcy.
Secured claims are not included in the administration of the estate as the
creditors have an actual proprietary right in certain assets of the debtor.
The rights held by secured creditors, whether or not they have been
accorded preferential status are clearly not the same as the rights of the
secured creditors. Holding that the preferred creditors actually have a
proprietary right in the assets of the insolvent debtor may be one way to
arrive at an equitable solution in this instance, but in light of the existence
of an alternative method, that is comity, it is simply bad law.
Regardless of what approach was ultimately adopted, Mr. Justice
Forsyth evaded what appears to be the heart of the problem: the
prohibition on the recognition of foreign tax claims and the statutory
adoption of this rule through a refusal to grant preferential status to such
claims. The common law rule is firmly embedded in Canadian conflict of
laws jurisprudence and Mr. Justice Forsyth cannot truly be criticized for
attempting to navigate around it rather than rejecting it outright. I am
certainly not as constrained and intend to deal with some of the problems
in the application of this principle.
VI. Recognition of Foreign Tax Claims
The rule with respect to foreign tax claims is stated by Castel as follows:
"As Canadian courts will not entertain an action for the enforcement
either directly or indirectly, of a foreign ... revenue law, they will not
enforce a foreign judgment ordering the payment of taxes...- 88 The first
case in which this doctrine was asserted is Boucher v. Lawson, 89 decided
in 1734. In that case, Lord Hardwicke refused to recognize a Portugese
revenue law which prohibited the exportation of gold from Portugal. In
discussing this case, one author has quite intuitively noted that England
was at war at this time and highly dependent on the shipping industry.90
He went on to state: "Thus the commercial necessity of an insular
economy gave birth to a rule of law."91 The rule of law in this instance
87. A.H. Oosterhoff, Tex4 Commentary and Cases on Trusts, (3d) (Toronto: Carswells, 1987)
p. 394.
88. Castel, supra, note 22, p. 255.
89. Eng Rep. 53 (K.B. 1734).
90. Mark McElroy, "The Enforcement of Foreign Tax Claims" (1960), 38 Univ. of Detroit
L.J.1.
91. Aid, p. 1.
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neither died, nor even withered, when England's economy became less
insular or less dependent on shipping.
The pivotal case on the recognition of foreign tax claims today is
Government of India v. Taylor (hereinafter referred to as India v.
Taylor).92 This case concerned a claim by the Revenue division of the
Government of India for an amount of income tax due from a company
which entered into a voluntary wind-up. The claim was therefore against
the liquidator of the estate. In determining the existence of an actual rule
of law which prohibits such claims, the House of Lords examined a
number of cases. Amongst the cases mentioned was In re Visser93 in
which it was stated:
there is a well recognized rule, which has been enforced for at least two
hundred years or thereabouts, under which the courts will not collect the
taxes of foreign states for the benefit of sovereigns of those sovereign
states 4
In addition to reciting a number of such passages from various cases
which stressed the pervasiveness of this rule, Lord Keith of Avonholm
outlined the basic justification for its application. He gave two possible
justifications, the first one being that the enforcement of a claim for taxes
is merely an extension of sovereign power. The enforcement of a foreign
tax claim would, as stated by Lord Keith, more or less be an assertion by
a sovereign authority of one state within the territory of another. The
second justification was derived from a statement by Judge Learned
Hand in Moore v. Mitchel 95 He stated:
To pass upon the provisions for the public order of another state is, at
any rate should be, beyond the powers of the court; it involves the
relations between the states themselves, with which courts are incompetent
to deal and which are entrusted to other authorities.96
Essentially, Judge Learned Hand equates revenue laws with penal
laws: "They affect a state in matters vital to its existence as its criminal
laws." Thus on the basis of these justifications and the case law, the
House of Lords unanimously decided that there is a rule of law which
precludes recognition of foreign revenue claims. The only other comment
in India v. Taylor which is relevant here was made by Lord Somervell of
Harrow. He stated that the only possible justification for recognizing a
claim would be on the basis of comity, but "it would be remarkable
92. [1955] 1 All E.R. 292 (H.L.).
93. In re Visser, The Queen of Holland v. Drukker, [1928] Ch. 877.
94. bid, p. 884.
95. Moore v. Mitchell (1929) 30 E (2d) 600.
96. Ibid, p. 604.
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comity if state B allowed the time of its courts to be expended in assisting
in this regard the tax gatherers of state A."97
The India v. Taylor case was fully endorsed by the Supreme Court of
Canada in US.A. v. Harden.98 The Supreme Court relied quite
substantially on India v. Taylor in concluding that an actual judgment on
a debt for taxes entered in the U.S. District Court for Southern California
was unenforceable in Canada. Thus there is little doubt that this rule is
firmly entrenched in Canadian jurisprudence.99
The law in the United States regarding foreign tax claims has
developed on a somewhat different line. The rule was originally adopted
in the U.S. and, "buttressed" by Judge Learned Hand in the above-noted
decision. The first few courts to reject Judge Learned Hand's
propositions, based their opinion on the presumption that tax is a form of
debt which a debtor impliedly contracts to pay. Regardless of the public
nature of the debt, as long as a judgment had been obtained, there was
no apparent reason why it should not be enforced. 1°°
The first case to step outside of the restriction that a judgment was
necessary was Oklahoma Tax Commissioner v. Rodgers. 10 In
comfiaenting on this case, Mark McElroy states in his article: "Comity
compelled enforcement and modem conditions demanded it. To permit
a citizen to enjoy the benefits of a government and then evade taxes by
stepping across its border was unwarranted and not to be encouraged."' 10 2
The court in that case also specifically addressed Judge Learned Hand's
comments on the comparable nature of penal laws and revenue laws and
stated quite simply that, "a penal law is punitive in nature, while a
revenue law defines the extent of the citizen's pecuniary obligation to the
state, and provides a remedy for its collection." 03
This statement recognizes that although penal laws and revenue laws
are similar to the extent that they both serve as instruments of public
policy, the main purpose of revenue laws are to generate revenue. This
distinction warrants recognition in the treatment of tax claims and
judgments in the context of conflict of laws. The above statement further
emphasizes the contractual element in a tax debt. Similar to any
contractual obligation, if a corporation enters into a foreign jurisdiction,
takes advantage of whatever that jurisdiction has to offer which
97. Supra, note 96, p. 301.
98. [1963] S.C.R. 366.
99. See as well Re Reid (1969), 2 D.L.R. (3d) 155 (B.C.S.C.); Re Dwelle Estate (1969) 69
W.W.R. 212 (Alta. S.C.).
100. McElroy, supra, note 91, p. 3 .
101. 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193 S.W. 2d 919 (1946).
102. McElroy, supra, note 91, p. 4.
103. Supra, note 102, p. 1122, 193 S.W. 2d at 926-927.
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compelled the corporation to enter it in the first place, relies on the laws
and perhaps special advantages associated with such laws and is allowed
to carry on business, it is simply a matter of the expectations of the parties
that the corporation should be liable for the payment of taxes. To reject
foreign tax claims in the context of a bankruptcy obscures the
expectations of the parties. The fact that one of the parties is a
government entity should not, and usually does not make a difference.
There is no rule which prohibits the recognition of a judgment obtained
by a government entity on a straight breach of contract. The same rules
would apply to the recognition of such a judgment as if the two parties
were private.
The final point that I wish to raise with respect to the development in
the United States in the area of recognition of foreign tax claims is the use
of reciprocity. For sometime, many decisions respecting foreign state tax
claims hinged on the probability of reciprocal treatment. In City of
Detroit v. Gould'0 4 the Supreme Court of Illinois explicitly dropped the
requirement altogether and stated, "there remains no reason of comity
upon which the courts of this state should deny this action."105
Thus it appears that the U.S., at least with respect to the recognition of
tax claims from other States, has developed far beyond the approach
adopted in Re SefeL Most significantly, the U.S. courts have done so with
the basic principle of "comity" as a primary tool. As pointed out above,
the U.S. Bankruptcy Code further provides for the recognition of claims
of foreign "governmental units" including revenue claims. In any event,
comity certainly warrants consideration in determining whether to
recognize a foreign tax claim. As you may recall, comity has traditionally
been used in situations which involve public as well as private law
considerations. That being the case, there would be no theoretical barrier
to its application with respect to tax claims given the inherently public
nature of revenue law. It was further stated above that there are no
particularly convincing reasons why comity should be restricted in
resolving international insolvency disputes. The Alberta Court refused to
extend it beyond the recognition of foreign proceedings. To stop short of
applying it to the recognition of a foreign tax claim in an international
insolvency, a field in which it is recognized as being a wholly acceptable
doctrine, is anachronistic and too formalistic.
Another way to approach this problem can be found in the law of
maritime liens1°6 and specifically the decision in Todd Shipyards v.
104. 12 Im. 2d 279, 146 N.E. 2d 61 (1957).
105. Ibid, p. 300 .
106. NV. Tetley, "The Law of Conflicts and Maritimes Liens: The U.S., Canada, the U.K. and
France" and Vaughan Black, "One If By Land, Two If By Sea", New Directions in Maritime
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Altema Compania Maritima 107 This case was referred to in the Re Sefel
decision. Forsyth J. used this case to support his conclusion that comity
has no place in the determination of priorities which are strictly a matter
of the lexforL In my reading of this case however, the Supreme Court of
Canada appears to be saying much more which may bear upon the
problems in Re SefeL Briefly, Todd Shipyards raised the issue of the
priority to be accorded to a claim for the cost of necessary repairs
resulting in a maritime lien in accordance with the law of New York.
Although maritime liens are accorded priority in Canada over a
mortgage, a claim for necessaries for repairs does not constitute a
maritime lien in Canadian courts. The Supreme Court of Canada
nonetheless recognized the claim and granted it priority applying the
following reasoning:
Although the supplier of necessaries is not entitled to a maritime lien
under Canadian law and all the cases cited by the learned author are
concerned with claims which are so recognized in this country, the cases
nevertheless clearly indicate that a valid maritime lien takes priority over
a mortgage, and as the claim for necessary repairs furnished in the U.S. is
recognized as creating that particular kind of lien and as being enforceable
as such in Canadian courts, it follows in my opinion, that the appellants'
claim in this case must be accorded priority over the mortgage held by the
respondent. 08
Thus the court first determined the nature of the right prior to working
it in to the Canadian priority scheme. This approach is probably.
impossible in the case at hand given the fact that the restriction in
Canadian bankruptcy legislation on foreign revenue claims is not based
on any substantive difference in the perception of what constitutes a tax
claim, but rather merely the fact of the claim being foreign. The
legislation has transformed what would typically be decided in
accordance with the proper law of the contract, that is the validity of the
claim, into a matter of priorities. Perhaps the legislature has public policy
reasons beyond those which are associated with the common law
prohibition and upon which I have hopefully cast some doubt, for
enacting this rule. Whatever may be the case, it does not accord with
one's sense of justice and certainly lacks flexibility.
Another possible approach may be rooted in the treatment of the
administration of estates. A duly appointed administrator'0 9 obtains title
Law 1984, (Toronto: Carswells, 1985). Both of these authors comment on some of the
approaches that have been adopted in maritime law, which has always dealt with conflict
problems. The approaches adopted in the past in this area may provide some guidance for the
resolution of modem international commercial disputes.
107. [1974] 2 S.C.R. 1248.
108. !btd, p. 1259.
109. The law of administration of estates is within provincial jurisdiction in Canada. An
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to only those assets which are located within the forum. To deal with
assets in a foreign jurisdiction, it is necessary to seek the appointment of
an administrator within that jurisdiction to distribute the assests in
accordance with the law of the forum. 110 Thus an estate with assets soley
in Canada would accept foreign claims, but only to the extent that the
law of the particular province recognizes such claims. If, however, the
same estate also had assets in Colorado, they could only be distributed in
accordance with the laws of Colorado."' If this were to be applied to the
distribution of assets in an international insolvency, and particularly to
the facts in Re Sefel a trustee would have to be appointed in Colorado
and the assets located there would be distributed in accordance with the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code. The U.S. creditors would obviously be granted
preferential status.
In general, however, this rather protective territorial approach is not
suitable in the realm of bankruptcy law. As previously stated, the aim of
bankruptcy law is to affect an equitable distribution of all the assets to all
of the creditors. This is most effectively achieved if there is at least an
attempt made to settle the estate in one jurisdiction with one trustee.
Canada has never adopted a strictly territorial approach to international
insolvencies and I would certainly not advocate doing so now.
Furthermore, a territorial approach is on the whole, inconsistent with the
general trend towards facilitating international and cross-border
transactions.
Both of these purported solutions would obviously require
amendments to the legislation, although the maritime lien approach
could be attempted in the absence of an amendment. It would simply be
another way to circumvent the legislation as was done in the Re Sefel
decision through unjust enrichment. Amending the Bankruptcy Act in
this way, however, is not advisable as it would only provide a patchwork
solution. Removing the restriction on the recognition of foreign revenue
administrator therefore only maintains the right to deal with assets within the particular
province in which the appointment is sought.
110. Castel, supra, note 22, chapter 27, p. 447-459.
111. The classic case in the administration of estates involving foreign facts is In re Kloebe;
Kannreuther v. Geisbrecht (1882) 28 Ch.D. 175. The case involved the recognition of a
foreign claim in an estate with no foreign assets. The court confirmed at p. 178 that, "a person
suing in this country must take the law as he finds it, he cannot by virtue of any regulation in
his own country, enjoy greater advantages than the other suitors here, and he ought not
therefore to be deprived of any superior advantage which the law of this country may confer."
In commenting on the situation where foreign assets are involved, the court further stated at
p. 180, "And when the legal representative has been constituted in the foreign country, whether
he be the executor of the domicile or another, the administration of assets must take place in
the foreign country, with the effect of giving the foreign creditors priority as regards the foreign
assets.. ." See as well Nadelmann, "Insolvent Decedent's Estates" (1951), 49 Mich. L.R. 1129.
440 The Dalhousie Law Journal
claims would solve many of the problems raised in Re Sefel, but would
likely only put a slight dent in the vast array of problems which arise in
the adjudication of international insolvencies. As in many other areas of
law which are associated with commercial activities," 2 it is essential to
adopt a unitary system. This could be achieved either in the form of an
international agreement or the uniformity of laws.
VII. A Unitary Approach to International Insolvency Law
The doctrine of "unity of bankruptcy", as previously mentioned, has
experienced little success in Canada, the United States and the United
Kingdom. This is as well true of the vast majority of nations 13 and
perhaps again reflects the fact that bankruptcy laws are considered an
extension of state policy. Most countries today would agree, however,
that an approach which embodied the principles and purposes of the
"unity of bankruptcy" doctrine would be advantageous. Nadelmann
notes that acceptance of this approach will only result when each nation
is assured that the others are following the same policy. This necessarily
requires a high degree of cooperation which Nadelmann comments,
"cannot be presumed."" 4
It is apparent that the private international law approach to
bankrupticies has shown no signs of achieving uniformity, and
concomitantly a modicum of certainty in fairness of treatment, on its own
accord. In light of this fact, it is surprising that there is not a more
significant body of bankruptcy treaties or international agreements. The
idea of adopting an international approach to bankruptcy rules is by no
means a recent development. Nadelmann discusses in one of his articles
a pamphlet entitled, "Outline of a Plan of an International Bankruptcy
Code for the Different Commercial States of Europe", which was written
by Jabez Henry in the early nineteenth century.1 5 It is interesting to note
that bankruptcy treaties themselves have been around for a long time.
112. For example there have been a number of tax treaties between Canada and the United
States which govern some of the problems raised by the overlapping of the two systems.
113. Nadelmann, "International Bankruptcy Law Its Present Status" (1943-44), 5 U. of
Toronto L.J. 324 at p. 343. This is essentially a survey article which examines the bankruptcy
laws of most European countries, Canada, the U.S., the U.K., South America and Latin
America as well as a few other countries. In spite of the fact that this article is somewhat dated,
it provides an excellent overview of the general approach to bankruptcies adopted throughout
the world.
114. Ibid., p. 343 .
115. Nadelmann, "An International Bankruptcy Code: New Thoughts on an Old Idea"
(1961), Int'l and Comp. L.Q. 70, at p. 70. J. Henry also wrote "Tract on Foreign Laws" which
Nadelmann notes came out in London in 1828.
Adjudication of International Insolvencies
John D. Honsberger mentions a treaty between two Italian City States,
Verona and Trent, concluded in 1204.116
Most notably, it is suprising that there is not an agreement between
Canada and the United States. Nadelmann commented in 1941 that, "the
fact that the United States and Canada, immediate neighbours with a
similar bankruptcy law, still are without any agreement on questions of
bankruptcy administrations involving both countries, must appear
strange." 117 It has been recognized that some form of agreement is needed
to govern bankruptcies which involve both Canada and United States.
Mr. Justice Nesbitt of the Supreme Court of Canada stated in 1905:
I think it is a very great pity that there should not be some legislation
immediately regulating many questions on international law, at any rate
between Canada and the United States. The growing interchange of
business, owing to the geographical continuity, makes it very important
that there should be well-defined rules applicable to both countries upon
many questions which are constantly arising. Take for instance,
bankruptcy, receiverships, administrations, etc....118
Recently, there has been some action towards formalizing an
agreement. In 1971 the Committee on Canada-United States Relations
was set up by the National Bankruptcy Conference of the United States
to examine the possibility of coordinating the two systems of law. 19 In
1970, a Canadian Committee, the Canadian Study Committee on
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Legislation, issued a report which remarked
on the problems encountered in the adjudication of international
insolvencies and determined that a treaty would provide a better solution
as compared to simply coordinating legislation. 20 There were no
negotiations, however, with respect to either approach until 1979 at
which time negotiations to draft a treaty got underway.
A draft treaty was released pursuant to these negotiations on October
29, 1979. The Treaty promotes a jurisdictional solution based upon the
territory within which the greater portion of the debtor's property is
116. John D. Honsberger, "The Negotiation of a Bankruptcy Treaty" (1985), The Meredith
Lectures, (McGill University) p. 287 at p. 288.
117. Nadelmann, "International Bankruptcy Law...", supra, note 25, p. 351.
118. David Rubin, "Canadian Comment: The U.S. Creditors' Unfair Advantage over
Canadian Creditors" (1979), 84 Comp. L.Q. 470, at p. 470. The comment by Mr. Justice
Nesbitt was made in an address to the Universal Congress of Lawyers and Jurists.
119. Rubin, supra, note 3, p. 471. Rubin quotes the actual stated purposes of this Committee
which were essentially to identify problems in the two systems which result in discrimination
of creditors on the basis of origin or which unecessarily hinder the smooth resolution of
disputes.
120. E. Bruce Leonard, "Can There Be International Cooperation in Foreign Bankruptcies?",
supra, note 75, at pp. 36-37.
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located.121 Incorporeal property is presumed to be located at the debtor's
principal place of business. Nadelmann criticizes this "property" oriented
approach primarily because of the volatility of property.'2 He also
comments that in failing to adequately address the private international
law rules, applicable in determining the extent to which the law of the
forum as opposed to foreign law should be applied, the drafters of the
treaty presumed that Canadian and American law is more or less the
same. This, as Nadelmann states, is "unrealistic." 13 The Committee
adjourned shortly thereafter at the request of the Canadians to await the
new proposals in the Canadian Bankruptcy Act Negotiations have not
since resumed and there has yet to be any major reforms to the Canadian
legislation. 124
Honsberger outlines the two approaches which can be adopted in a
treaty. It may either impose a unitary international system which
overrides local law or in the alternative, provide for a choice of law to be
applicable to individual proceedings on a case-by-case basis. The U.S.-
Canada Draft Treaty adopted the latter approach. The Treaty determines
which forum has jurisdiction, then the law of that jurisdiction steps in to
govern the adjudication of the proceedings. The declarations of that court
would consequently be accorded transnational effect. A Draft EEC
Convention which appeared in 1970 adopted the former approach.12
The EEC Draft Bankruptcy Convention of 1970 has been discussed in
numerous academic works and need not be addressed here in any
detail.126 A second Draft Convention emerged in 1980 which is at present
still under consideration. 27 The only aspect of the Convention that
warrants discussion here is the treatment of preferential claims. Unlike
the 1970 Convention, the 1980 Convention does not provide for a
unitary system, but rather proposes a code of private international law for
the Community. 28 The rules pertaining to secured and preferential claims
are, however, a "derogation from the general rules referring the effects of
a bankruptcy to the private international law rules of the country in
121. Nadelmann, "A Reflection on Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: News From the European
Common Market, the United States and Canada" (1982), 27 McGill L.J. 541, at p. 550.
122. id, p. 550.
123. bid, p. 551.
124. Leonard..., supra, note 76, p. 37.
125. Honsberger, supra, note 116, p. 294-295.
126. The pivotal work on the 1970 Treaty is Muir Hunter, "The Draft Bankruptcy
Convention of the European Economic Communities" (1972), 21 Int'l. and Comp. L.Q. 682.
The 1968 Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters excluded bankruptcies.
127. D. Lasok, P.A. Stone, Conflict of Laws in the European Community, (London:
Professional Books Limited, 1988), p. 397 .
128. Honsberger, supra, note 116, p. 295 .
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which the bankruptcy has been opened."' 129 Lasok and Stone comment
that, "these provisions submit securities and preferences to the law of the
country in which the property in question is situated". This results in
what is referred to as a "sub-estate for accounting purposes in relation to
each Member State in which assets to be realized are situated". 130 Thus,
for the most part, one court is seised with jurisdiction of the bankruptcy,
but not so as to prejudice the jurisdiction of otherwise competent courts
and authorities to determine the existence, amount or preferential status of
fiscal or similar debts [and] social security debts... nor so as to prejudice
the jurisdiction of the courts of the situs of the registered property to
determine what secured or preferential rights affect the property.131
In spite of the fact that this appears to be an ideal solution, especially
to the problems encountered in Re Sefe the possibility of ever actually
formalizing an agreement in Treaty form is slim. This is particularly true
of the existing situation between Canada and the United States. One
author has commented that:
realistically there is little prospect of reaching a consensus on a treaty
within a reasonable time frame. The conflict of law issues, the national
jurisdictional jealousies of the two countries and the ideological and
political differences of the countries in matters such as Crown priorities all
result in the unlikelihood of a Canada/United States treaty in the near
future. 32
This being the case, the only other possible alternative is uniform
legislation. Nadelmann comments that, "Unification of law through
uniform legislation is a long drawn-out affair, but it is the only practicable
approach to the problem in the United States."'133 The American
International Bar Association has taken some initiative in this respect in
proposing a Model International Insolvency Co-operation Act (MIICA).
This document essentially suggests that what is needed is "comparable
legislation" in each country based on a less flexible version of section 304
of the present Bankruptcy Code. The legislation would, "proceed on a
basis that presumptively recognized the authority of the court having
jurisdiction over the debtor, provided that jurisdiction was properly
supportable on what might be termed 'generally accepted conflicts of law
principles' ".134
The MIICA does provide a universal approach to the administration
of bankruptcies, but it does not appear to remedy the problems
129. Lasok, supra, note 127, p. 406.
130. Ibid, pp. 406-407.
131. Ibid, pp. 401-402.
132. Leonard, supra, note 76, p. 38.
133. Nadehmann, "An International Bankruptcy Code ..." supra, note 115, p. 82.
134. Leonard, supra, note 75, p. 40.
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encountered as a result of the separate private international laws of both
countries and their application to bankruptcy proceedings. It does not, for
example, remedy the problems in Re SefeL At the very most, it may in
such a situation serve as an indicator of the prevailing attitude towards
the administration of bankruptcies and consequently lead a court to
adopt principles such as comity to recognize otherwise prohibited claims.
The prospect of actually putting the MIICA or any other agreement
into effect is unlikely. Canada has been attempting to amend its own
bankruptcy legislation to bring it more in line with some of the demands
of increasing global integration and multinational business for some time,
but even these efforts have been fruitless to date.135 There simply appears
to be a lack of political motivation to bring about any major changes in
this area of law on a domestic, bilateral or multilateral level.
VIII. Conlcusion
Kurt Nadelmann has noted that, "As in all areas of conflicts, in
bankruptcy the most serious difficulties come from statutory provisions
preventing courts from reaching reasonable and equitable results". 136 In
light of the fact that it is improbable that any substantial legislative or
treaty reforms will occur in the field of international insolvencies, perhaps
the doctrine of comity affords the most hope at present. It provides a
flexible, albeit uncertain, approach to recognizing foreign claims and
proceedings and permits a court to arrive at an equitable solution.
Furthermore it is established as an acceptable doctrine in the realm of
international insolvency law in both Canada and the United States.
Comity has also been recognized, at least with respect to the United
States, in determining the recognition of foreign revenue claims.
Although Canada has to date refused to adopt this position, I hope that
I have succeeded in casting some doubt upon this approach in pointing
out its inability to reflect the realities of transnational business ventures.
It is thus apparent that comity may provide all of the answers to the
problems raised in Re Sefel and although such solutions do not address
the inherent problems in the treatment of international bankruptcy law,
comity does furnish the court with an acceptable and appropriate
temporary remedy.
135. Tbid, p. 37. The authors note, however, that "the promise of new legislation" has recently
resurfaced.
136. Nadelmann, "Assumption of Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents" (1966), 41
Tul. L. Rev. 75 atp. 81.
